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Utilizing AMCs to Tackle Eurozone’s
Legacy Non-Performing Loans
by Emilios Avgouleas45 and Charles Goodhart1 46
Abstract
The recovery of the Eurozone (EZ) economy has made even more pressing
the tackling of its debt overhang with the bulk of over 1 trillion Non-Performing
Loans (NPLs) concentrated in the more vulnerable economies of the EZ
periphery. There is clearly a need to adopt a more radical approach to resolving
NPLs than merely augmenting supervisory tools and national legal frameworks.
The discussion about the feasibility of country-based or Pan-European Asset
Management Companies (AMCs) to tackle legacy NPLs has recently intensiﬁed.
Yet political objections premised on fears of debt mutualisation, the structural
and legal questions surrounding the possible establishment of AMCs, and
diﬀering recovery rates and levels of market transparency within the EZ have
led to the dismissal of the idea by the European Council. This article discusses
the merits and shortcomings of AMCs in tackling NPLs and proposes a
comprehensive structure for a Pan-European “bad bank” with virtually ring-
fenced country subsidiaries to ensure burden sharing without debt
mutualisation. The proposed “bad bank” structure intends to resolve a host of
governance, valuation, and transparency problems that would otherwise
surround a “bad bank” solution. Also, the proposed scheme is in eﬀective
compliance with the EU state aid regime and could lead, if implemented, to the
alleviation of the EZ debt overhang to stimulate credit growth.
45. Professor (Chair) in International Banking Law and Finance, University of Edinburgh.
46. Norman Sosnow Professor of Economics (emeritus), LSE.
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1. Introduction
The gradual recovery of the Eurozone (EZ) economy has made even more
pressing the tackling of legacy Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) in the EZ.
Authoritative sources (Aiyar et al. 2015) have pointed out that the huge load
of NPLs standing at more than 1 trillion EUR at ECB’s latest estimation is
clearly a serious impediment on EZ growth, especially as the bulk of them is
concentrated in the more vulnerable economies of the EZ periphery. So far,
most countries concerned have been slow in tackling the NPL problem. This
has highlighted the need to adopt more radical steps than merely augmenting
the supervisory tools and national legal frameworks dealing with NPLs,
though the latter have been necessary and essential reforms. It also explains
why the discussion about the feasibility of country-based or Pan-European
Asset Management Companies (AMCs) that will purchase, securitise, workout,
and dispose the bulk of legacy NPLs has intensiﬁed since last year (e.g., Bruno
et al. 2017; Enria 2017; Haben, Quagliarello 2017; ECB 2016). For their
proponents, AMCs oﬀer the fastest and most radical remedy for Eurozone’s
NPL problem. Yet political objections premised on fears of debt mutualisation
within the EZ, and the structural and legal questions surrounding the possible
establishment of a Pan-European Fund or country-based AMCs, led to the
dismissal of the idea in the ECOFIN’s informal meeting in Malta in April 2017. 
Amongst the ﬁrst contributions to this debate was a proposal by the
authors of this note sketching a form of privately funded AMC backed by a
ﬁscal backstop to tackle EZ bank NPLs (Avgouleas, Goodhart 2016). In this
note we revisit the issue with a view to painting a more detailed picture of
our proposal. But before we set out our proposal it is apposite to summarize
the structural and legal obstacles that the process/eﬀort to tackle EZ NPLs
through an AMC would face. The structural problems are more, or less, the
same that have prevented the creation of a liquid secondary market for NPLs
in Europe. They are in summary: 
bankruptcy regimes with a pro-debtor bias: this is a shortcoming that is(a)
gradually being remedied through the introduction of out-of-court procedures
and a code of conduct for NPL settlement, aiding the recovery process; 
long recovery times and high recovery costs, which diﬀer on a country-to-(b)
country basis, (even if the NPL laws are increasingly being harmonised), due
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to diﬀering legal and judicial cultures and diﬀerent degrees of restructuring
skills on the business side as well as variable legal legal infrastructure
eﬀectiveness; 
low and diﬀering levels of transparency, which, ﬁrst, create “market for(c)
lemons”47 conditions in the secondary market, and intensify bid ask spread
discrepancies;
appreciable disparities between net book value (ex provisions) and market(d)
value, mostly as a result (a)-(c) factors above which amount to a major
disincentive to clean up the pile of NPLs in the EZ, since a sale way below
net book value would generate serious capital write oﬀs, 48 possibly
triggering the bail-in process under the BRRD (Avgouleas, Goodhart 2016);
EZ banks’ low proﬁtability, which, in turn is partly due to the burden NPLs(e)
place on bank balance sheets, and in part to a sluggish interest rates. Under
these conditions there is little, or no, prospect of accumulating suﬃcient
retained proﬁt to absorb losses from the writing down of NPL values.
These structural obstacles are complemented by the constraints posed by
the EU State Aid laws and the EU Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive’s
(BRRD) near complete prohibition of making available public funding to an
ailing bank, including resorting to public money to fund bank recapitalisation
in resolution, unless, in the latter case, a round or rounds of creditor bail-ins
have taken place ﬁrst.
The interaction of these structural obstacles and the BRRD constraints
have also less tangible, but evident, behavioural consequences in the form of
regulatory and bank management forbearance (Avgouleas, Goodhart 2016).
Where the problem of NPLs is systemic aﬀecting several banks (e.g., Greece,
Italy), bank management and their regulators may wish to avoid, at least for
a time, the bitter pill of capital write oﬀs in fear of the institutional and
systemic consequences that a wave of bank bail-ins could give rise to.  
In the remainder of our note we ﬁrst set out in summary the key beneﬁts
and costs for using country-based or Pan-European AMCs to tackle EZ NPLs,
and then we give a detailed description of our proposal and how we consider
the above challenges could be met by our plan.
47. Akerloﬀ (1970).
48. For a very comprehensive exposition of this problem see Bruno, B, G. Lusignani, and M. Onado (2017).
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2. AMCs and NPL Resolution –Pros and Cons
In a nutshell, the advantages of using AMCs to clean up bank balance
sheets are the following:
(a) The solution can be quite radical and may be the best way to provide a
ﬁscal backstop to the banking sector; the ensuing virtuous cycle of
renewed bank credit, strengthened economic growth, and increased bank
proﬁtability has oﬅen worked miracles for NPL resolution and the ﬁnancial
results of AMC “bad banks”. Such burden sharing and attendant ﬁnancial
engineering has been successfully employed in a variety of NPL transfer
schemes during the Asian crisis of late 1990s (Arner, Avgouleas, Gibson
2017);
(b) AMCs can secure economies of scale in tackling NPLs, especially where a
large part of the AMC’s portfolio comprises corporate NPLs, which, in
general, are harder to restructure than receivables NPLs. In speciﬁc, AMCs
can provide economies of scale in hiring professionals with turnaround
skills or negotiating with private equity ﬁrms, securing thus higher
recovery values;  
(c) AMCs can provide economies of scale vis-à-vis the issuance and marketing
of tranches of debt collateralised with distressed loans, widening the size
of the secondary market for distressed debt and making it more liquid;
(d) Finally, with an AMC it could be easier to implement debt to equity swaps,
due to minimum or limited capital requirements, a distinct disadvantage
facing banks engaging in this method of debt write oﬀs.
This encouraging picture is not uniform. The use of a country AMC to
resolve the Scandinavian banking crisis and the Asian ﬁnancial crisis proved
to be a success. On the other hand, the post-2008 experience in Europe has
been more mixed. From the three countries that have used “bad banks” only
Ireland’s NAMA shows encouraging signs of ﬁnal value recovery and that may
also be down to the underlying strength of the Irish economy. 
The use of AMCs to resolve NPLs can face important challenges which in
the main can be summarised as follows:
(a) the governance issue – mostly relating to a fear of cherry picking, or that
the bad bank will be used to restructure loans to related parties at
favourable terms, or to warehouse and hide worthless assets. Debt to
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equity swaps may encounter a similar problem resulting in the rescue of
“zombie” companies” (IMF, 2016 on the challenges of Chinese scheme);
(b) limited transparency and uncertainty about the quality of bank disclosures
and due diligence can give rise to a “market for lemons” situation;
(c) asset valuation – the choice of measures to be employed to calculate NPL
value, e.g., market value, book value, net book value, or long-term
economic value is a matter of great importance both for the success of the
scheme and the distribution of losses. Of course, this is no simple matter
as the rate of NPL recovery, especially vis-à-vis corporate and real estate
loans, is also dependent on the prevailing conditions of demand in the
market and the state of the macroeconomic cycle; 
(d) ultimate loss absorption – which party will absorb any losses on
liquidation and winding up.   
In addition, bank management’s and owners’ incentives are crucial,
especially since regulatory “coercion” may not be able to oﬀer immediate
results or at least not without running the risk of ﬁresales. Either the bank’s
management is incentivised to sell or it is forced to sell. While the latter may
be achieved through a host of supervisory tools attached to the bank recovery
and resolution plans and stress tests, as well as BRRD’s early intervention
regime, a less enforced approach may secure higher market prices. On the
other hand, unsurprisingly, especially where the deterioration of the loan book
is mostly due to macroeconomic factors, shareholders (who presumably will
resent being wiped out) and management (who presumably will be replaced)
will obviously be less than happy to cooperate willingly.  Of course, BRRD’s
early intervention regime and some other provisions of EU regulatory regime
oﬀer wide supervisory discretion, up to and including changing management,
with a view of replacing it with one presumably more energetic in tackling
NPLs. But without resolving the underlying problems the supervisor must
also be determined to push the bank into resolution. This of course entails
(under the BRRD) a bail-in possibly in more than one bank, a feared prospect
for regulators due to the capacity for systemic disruption when NPLs are
spread system-wide, or anticipated problems to fund the bank post-resolution. 
Bank management can be incentivised to sell if the price is closer to net
book value, book value ex provisions, rather than the normally much lower
market price, a gap that may in fact worsen in the case of forced selling
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leading to ﬁresales. Proﬁt and loss (P&L) agreements can resolve the issue of
the ﬁnal division of losses but they will not constitute a clean break for the
bank’s balance sheet. Any future losses resulting from P&L arrangements act
as a contingent liability inhibiting balance sheet growth for some time. Our
earlier proposal considered capped P&L agreements to tackle this matter
directly and avoid creating unlimited contingent liabilities. Another approach
would be to make the banks hold an equity stake in the member state AMCs
which would also help to increase the cushion that would be available before
private bondholders are hit, allowing the banks to avoid facing extensive
clawbacks. Nonetheless, bundling all banks in the same bracket regardless of
their volume of NPLs and portfolio riskiness (objectively measured by
reference to the recovery rate of NPLs) would raise moral hazard concerns.
3. The Proposal 
3.1 AMC Rationale
In the absence of willing buyers at prices that would not be very far from
banks’ estimations of the asset’s value, all recommendations for quick
liquidation of NPLs in the current environment of low bank proﬁtability would
just deliver European banks straight into the hands of the resolution
authorities, or worse into liquidation, despite the rapid modernisation of NPL
tackling procedures through amendments to insolvency law and the adoption
of requisite codes of conduct. We believe that this gap between expectations
for rapid NPL resolution in the EZ and reality can be bridged through a
specially designed AMC scheme.
AMCs, in general, have an encouraging record in tackling NPLs,
notwithstanding the distributional concerns associated with the problem of
valuations. Given the high level of corporate NPLs in the EBU and specialized
turnaround (and possibly private equity) skills required to work-out such
credits, AMCs also oﬀer the distinct advantage of oﬀering economies of scale
in tackling corporate NPLs and creating liquid secondary markets for
distressed debt. Yet only four countries use them in the EU (Ireland, Spain,
Germany, and lately Italy). Moreover, a pan-European bad bank could ensure
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diversiﬁcation of losses and peer pressure for the rapid resolution of NPLs. At
the same time, we acknowledge that the “market for lemons” problem is
asymmetrical from country to country and legislative reform is not suﬃcient
to resolve it. In addition, costs of recovery can be uneven on a country by
country basis, preventing the formation of a fully-ﬂedged Pan-European bad
bank. We also accept that, objections based on burden-sharing arguments are
not going to go away, whatever the legal argument against them, as they are
essentially part of the predominant (and unwritten) doctrine underpinning the
EMU so far, i.e., that the fallen pay the price for their fall. 
So, the circumstances call for an eﬀective compromise solution. To this
eﬀect, we suggest that the following ideas can provide the best solution to the
EBU bad-bank conundrum.
3.2 AMC Structure 
In our opinion the most eﬀective approach to tackle NPLs through an AMC
scheme would involve the formation of a pan-European holding company that
would preside over quasi-ring-fenced country-based AMCs. The holding
company would have as initial shareholders all EBU member states with a
share-capital participation that would be a factor of a symbolic, but not totally
insigniﬁcant, participation of (say 1 billion EUR) multiplied by the share of
NPLs to total loans of the country’s banking sector multiplied by a factor that
represents the country’s share of the EBU GDP. E.g., if we assume that Greece
represents 2% of the EBU GDP and its level of NPLs is 45%, the Greek
participation should be 1billion EUR x 45/50 = 900 million EUR. On the other
hand, if we assume that Germany represents 40% of EBU GDP and its level of
NPLs as certiﬁed by the competent supervisor, probably the single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) is 5%, the participation of Germany in the pan-European
holding AMC would be, 1billion EUR x 5/2.5= 2billion EUR. The holding
company would set up country-based AMCs as subsidiaries. The initial
shareholders of country AMCs would be the Holding Company participating
as a private investor (but with increased governance rights) at a minimum of
10% of member state AMCs’ issued share capital. Namely, it would participate
in the same way as, by analogy, a private equity limited partner with its
potential losses ﬁrmly capped. The Holding Company’s participation to the
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member state AMCs would represent, at a minimum, the country’s
participation in the holding company). All member state banks wishing to do
business with the AMC would participate to the AMC’s initial share capital
with a share-capital contribution (each) of a minimum x 1 times the country’s
participation in the holding company, less if their share of NPLs over total
loans is lower than the national average, more if their share is higher than the
national average. The losses or proﬁts of each AMC would be cleared at the
national level. The board of the holding company would have the responsibility
for appointing the board of country AMCs, holding an open tender. The three
supervising institutions (SSM, the Commission, and the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) would have to be informed of requisite appointments).
Country AMCs would have to appoint the European Investment Bank (EIB) as
an advisor to implement the valuation method advised below. 
To avoid excessive upfront recapitalisations as well as unmanageable long-
term losses to the AMCs and thus oﬀer incentives to both bank management
to sell the NPLs and private investors to buy debt issued by the AMCs, we
suggest the following valuation approach. The NPLs would be transferred to
the AMC at a price that is the weighted average (33% each) of the net book
value (i.e., book value ex provisions), the long-term economic value of the
asset as calculated by the EIB (LTEV),49 and the market value of the assets to
be transferred. The triple weighting is of course bound to provide a marked
upliﬅ in terms of transfer price. But it also reﬂects the fact that in some cases,
e.g., Italy, the economy has posted anaemic growth rates since 2008 and
before, so any economic boost would result in a substantial rise in market
prices. Other countries, like Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, have lost a considerable
portion of their GDP and any return to growth is bound to liﬅ asset prices and
thus valuations to substantially higher levels than current market prices.
One objective way to ﬁnd the current market value could be through
holding an auction under which the bank will sell to interested buyers a sample
49. The LTEV variable suggested here is already employed in the valuation of NPLs transferred by Irish
banks to the country’s AMC the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), which was set up in the
wake of the country’s bailout by the Eurozone and ensuing re capitalisation of its banking system. It is
derived as a combination of market value and an upliﬅ of 0-25% to reﬂect the long-term economic value
of the asset when conditions in the market and the ﬁnancial system normalize and the reasonably expected
future yield of the asset based on historical performance. The weighted average upliﬅ has been 8.2%.
NAMA has bought NPLs from the Irish banks at an average discount of 57% of face value. 
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of assets similar to the assets about to be transferred to the AMC. Namely, the
bids for the pre-transfer auctions would refer to actual transfers and not
submission of ﬁctitious bids, as was the case with Libor rate setting in the pre-
2012 period. The fact that LTEV valuations would be conducted by the EIB
could secure objectivity in the calculation of this key stabilising variable. 
Overall the objective of the AMC would be to buy the asset at a price that
wouldn’t trigger a requirement for extensive capital injections, so that, if
possible, the impact on bank capital of relevant losses would be manageable,
or could be amortized and absorbed in conjunction with other measures
currently adopted to boost EU bank capital.
3.3 Burden-Loss-sharing
Following the winding up of the AMC operations any residual losses to
the AMC would ﬁrst be absorbed by its shareholders (i.e., the banks and the
Pan-European AMC). The AMC could employ structured P&L agreements with
banks. These agreements could provide the following claw back clause. When
the losses from NPLS sold by a speciﬁc bank (or banks) exceed the average
level of losses the AMC has experienced in its overall NPL portfolio, then that
bank (banks) would have to make further payments to the AMC, amortized
over a period and capped by the amount that the money loss emanating from
the speciﬁc bank’s NPLs proportionately exceeded the amount the AMC would
have lost if the speciﬁc bank’s (banks’) NPLs had scored the same levels of
recovery as the portfolio average. This is a good way to penalize a bank (or
banks) whose portfolio of transferred NPLs fall below AMC average in terms
of recovery values. Such structured P&L arrangements would contain the
worst oﬀenders and thus they would counter moral hazard. In addition, they
would maximize banks’ incentives to engage in honest conduct with the AMC. 
80% of any further residual losses in the country-based scheme would be
covered by an ESM guarantee that the country could procure at any time
under the indirect bank recapitalization instrument (broadly deﬁned, i.e., loans
certainly include contingent future loans: guarantees) and under the so-called
“precautionary recapitalisation” process, i.e., without triggering the BRRD
conditions. The indirect “precautionary” recapitalisation facility is explicitly
envisaged under the current ESM regulations. These arrangements would
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leave AMC’s private bondholders with very limited exposure to AMC losses,
thus, they signiﬁcantly boost AMC’s chances to ﬁnd private bond ﬁnance to
fund its purchase of bank NPLs.
However, philosophical problems relating to moral hazard and the Too-
Big-To-Fail concerns would remain. Thus, we suggest that banks selling NPLs
to the AMC - other distressed ﬁnancial instruments ought to be excluded from
the scheme - could be subject to a structural conditionality to cede business
and branches, if the authorities thought it necessary. Such conditionality
would tackle fears of reinforcing big banks and the TBTF subsidy though the
AMC scheme. It could also be a suﬃcient measure to conform with the EU
state aid framework and open-up Eurozone banking markets to new
contestants/entrants. 
3.4 The distribution of competences between the Pan-European Hold-
ing Company and member state AMCs
The Holding Company should be a fund jointly owned by the participating
member states set up to run for an initial period of ﬁve years. There is no
reason for it to be an inter-governmental or EU agency. While it would seem
logical that the Holding Company should be an ESM subsidiary, such a move
might trigger fears of debt mutualisation. In addition, the ESM may have a
conﬂict of interests given that it would provide guarantees to each member
state-based AMC through the member state concerned. Thus, the holding
company would have to be a separate corporate body that is wholly owned by
the participating EZ member states. 
The board of the Holding Company would report to the SSM, the EU
Commission, and the ESM every 6 months. The reports could be made public.
Each member state would be able to exercise the percentage of voting rights
that would correspond to its stake in the Holding Company’s share capital. 
In the beginning, the Holding Company would not be able to borrow
money to downstream liquidity to its country subsidiaries but that restriction
could be altered by a decision of the 2/3 of Holding Company shareholders.
Voting in this case would be based on the principle of one share one vote.  In
the case that the board of the holding company cannot reach a decision on
one of the matters it considers (other than leveraging its balance sheet), its
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articles should provide that in that case all shareholders’ voting rights are
automatically transferred to the EU Commission, the ESM, and the ECB whose
decisions would have to be taken by a two thirds majority of their own votes
bypassing the company’s shareholders. This power should exist to discourage
standstills and encourage consensus building. 
Each country-based AMC would have the freedom to decide how to meet
its ﬁnancing needs given that this would also be dictated by the quality of its
portfolio of assets. The funding strategy would be determined through a
resolution of the AMCs’ shareholders in a process where the vote would be
by majority and the holding company would not enjoy supra-voting rights, as
in the case of board appointments. On the other hand, the holding company
would ensure that each country-level (ring-fenced) subsidiary operates under
the same conditions of governance, transparency, disclosure, and valuations.
In addition, the holding company could establish and control FinTech
platforms, given their ability to safely hold and disseminate due diligence
reports, to eﬀect direct sales of assets from the AMCs to any interested
investors, augmenting the integrity and reliability of the platform. 
Such centralisation of rules and operations presents distinct advantages.
First, it secures comparability of operations and performance. Comparability
of performance would of course expose NPL recovery problems generated by
any odd legal and regulatory regimes. It would also eliminate any excuses on
behalf of national authorities and bank management to create a functional
secondary market for NPLs. Secondly, it would ameliorate governance and
transparency discrepancies, since the matter of valuations would be handled
by the EIB, and the AMC’s management would be a matter for the Pan-
European AMC to decide and not of country authorities and bank AMC
shareholders. In case of strong disagreements with the latter the three
supervising institutions (the SSM, the Commission, and the ESM) could have
the ﬁnal word. Third, centralisation would augment the accountability of the
management of AMCs. Fourth, the combined impact of centralisation of
decision-making process and operations would take the sting of moral hazard
and unequal governance away from the provision of an ESM guarantee to the
country-based AMCs.
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3.5 Legal Considerations
AMC transactions with going concern banks need not meet the BRRD
requirements. NPLs could be transferred to the AMC by banks that have neither
entered the resolution or pre-resolution stage. But another obstacle would
remain: the EU state-aid rules under article 107 TFEU. Inevitably, such injection
of public funds would indeed amount to some form of state assistance but could
be allowed under certain circumstances under Article 107(3)(b) of the TFEU.
In general, EU state aid rules have been applied to the EU banking sector with
various degrees of ﬂexibility. The suggested here ESM guarantee is not a
permanent transfer and of course, it may never be triggered. If the ESM
guarantee is oﬀered (via the state) to the country AMCs on commercial terms,
earlier decisions of the EU Commission on state aid by means of guarantees
oﬀered by the state on commercial terms become relevant.50
However, the 2013 Commission Communication on State Aid Rules in the
banking sector declared that state aid to assist with a capital shortfall should
be preceded by all possible measures to minimise the cost of remedying that
shortfall, including burden-sharing by shareholders and subordinated
creditors. Micossi et al. 2016 point out that the Communication is the
exception in the Commission’s State Aid jurisprudence and, in any case, it
should not be construed independently of the Treaty Principle of
Proportionality. Moreover, the Banking Communication itself (para. 45) oﬀers
an ‘exception rule’ from burden-sharing, which can be derogated when
implementing burden-sharing measures would endanger ﬁnancial stability or
could lead to disproportionate results. 
But while Advocate General Wahl in the Kotnik case,51 the 2013
Communication expressing the view that the only binding legal rule is Article
50. See EU Commission, Press Release, “State aid: Commission gives ﬁnal approval to existing guarantee
ceiling for German HSH Nordbank”, 3 May 2016. The rationale of earlier Commission decisions on the
supply of an asset protection guarantee to Nordbank by its majority shareholders, the Landen of Hamburg
and Schleswig Holstein, centered on the fact that the guarantee was oﬀered on commercial terms. The
latest decision requires drastic asset disposals. While the decision refers to state aid oﬀered before the
implementation of the BRRD and it is probably not the right precedent, the commercial terms language
may not be ignored.  
51. Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, case C-526/14, Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike
Slovenije, 18 February 2016. 
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107 the Court of Justice laid down instead some guidance on how the
Communication should be interpreted holding it as binding.52 In speciﬁc, the
Court held that53:
The burden-sharing measures are designed to ensure that, prior to the
grant of any State aid, the banks which show a capital shortfall take steps,
with their investors, to reduce that shortfall, speciﬁcally by raising equity
capital and obtaining a contribution from subordinated creditors since such
measures are likely to limit the amount of the State aid granted. 
Clearly, this requirement is met by obliging banks to become shareholders in
the AMC with the clear risk that their participation may be written oﬀ to absorb
losses. But authorities may deem that to meet the burden sharing requirement
banks participating in the suggested scheme may conduct rights issues to
increase their equity capital buﬀers while selling their NPLs to the AMCs. 
On the other hand, things are less clear as regards the conversion/write oﬀ
of subordinated creditors. On this issue the Court gave a rather ambivalent
interpretation, which, on the one hand, explicitly acknowledged that it is legal
and legitimate for member states to refrain from bailing-in subordinated
creditors outside the BRRD framework, and, on the other, it states that all such
cases will be examined ad hoc and such exemption may make a state injection
of funds fall foul of the state aid prohibition.54 In our view the Court’s
ambivalent statement on the matter should be read in conjunction with para.
45 of the Commission Banking Communication about exceptional
circumstances. This combined reading leads to the conclusion that exempting
subordinated creditors from sharing the burden of any NPL losses under the
scheme will not endanger the legality of the scheme.
52. Court of Justice of the European Union, case C-526/14, Tadej Kotnik and Others v Drzǎvni zbor Republike
Slovenije 19 July 2016.
53. Ibid.
54. The Court’s exact wording is as follows: ‘As regards measures for conversion or write-down of
subordinated debt, the Court considers that a Member State is not compelled to impose on banks in
distress, prior to the grant of any State aid, an obligation to convert subordinated debt into equity or to
aﬀect a write-down of the principal of that debt, or an obligation to ensure that that debt contributes fully
to the absorption of losses. In such circumstances, it will not however be possible for the envisaged State
aid to be regarded as having been limited to what is strictly necessary. The Member State, and the banks
who are to be the recipients of the contemplated State aid, take the risk that there will be a decision by
the Commission declaring that aid to be incompatible with the internal market. The Court adds however
that measures for conversion or write-down of subordinated debt must not go beyond what is necessary
to overcome the shortfall of the bank concerned.’ Ibid. 
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Accordingly, we believe that the hybrid Euro-AMC scheme suggested here
will not fall foul of EU State Aid rules. The scheme secures a substantial
amount of burden sharing (the paramount requirement of the EU
communication and of the Enria 2017 plan) and the magnitude of the
disturbance and the impact of the continuous debt overhang on the economies
of the Eurozone countries concerned is such as to warrant the suggested
measures.
Finally, the nature of any transfers via the ESM under the “precautionary
recapitalisation” scheme would within the spirit of Art. 125 TFEU as
authoritatively interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU in the Pringle case.55
4. Conclusion
Most Eurozone leaders regard Pan-European AMCs with suspicion as there
is a general fear of their redistributive outcomes. So, to clean up bank balance
sheets without pushing Eurozone banks into bail-in centred recapitalisations,
necessitated by the present dearth of investor interest in EZ bank equity, we
have considered the possibility of a hybrid Euro-AMC. The holding company
approach we have suggested secures the capping and minimisation of any
ﬁscal transfers while it lays down the groundwork for a future EBU ﬁscal
backstop for the banking sector which to us seems both desirable and
inevitable, as much as it is legal under the Pringle reading of Art. 125 TFEU.
In addition, the use of AMCs would act as a catalyst for attracting new private
entrants and boosting liquidity in the euro-market for distressed bank debt.
Sales of NPLs to a member state AMCs would free up capital for new lending,
relieving Eurozone periphery’s debt overhang. Moreover, radical balance sheet
cleaning up and the near elimination of banks’ future exposure would be good
news for the market and could encourage fresh injections of equity investment
in the EZ banks concerned. A ﬁnal beneﬁt is that the suggested AMC scheme
could, indirectly, relieve current pressure placed on the ECB in the context of
sometimes controversial bank bond purchase programmes. 
55. Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General Judgment of the Court of 27
November 2012, CJEU Case C-370/12, esp. paras 136-137. Reiterated in the more recent Peter Gauweiler
and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (CJEU, Case C-62/14), paras. 135-136.
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Appendix: 
Suggested Structure of an EZ AMC (Bad Bank) Scheme for NPLs & Burden Sharing
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LOSSES:
80% shareholders & claw back against the least performing bank & ESM guarantee
procured by the member state.
Residual losses if any fall on dondholders according to trheir seniority.
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